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THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST RELIGIOUS
BELIEF: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY
CLAUSES OF THE ICCPR AND THE ECHR
M. TODD PARKER*
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of religion, though forming part of the “core” of most
conceptions of human rights, continues to remain a “particularly
controversial right.”1 While religious liberty is now viewed by the
international community as a “privilege that is so foundational and
precious that it should be guaranteed by international law,” its scope
and function remain open to significant debate and disagreement.2
Some attribute this tension in part to religious claims to “possession
of [] absolute truth,” which may result in lack of respect for the
freedom of members of other faiths.3 In addition, some religious
authorities view conversion to other religions as punishable heresy,
and thus reject religious freedom as antithetical to their core religious
values.4
In addition to these specifically religious reasons for narrowing
the scope of religious freedom, governments in many regions of the
world actively deny religious liberty. This denial ranges from the
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1. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 309-10 (1993).
2. ROBERT F. DRINAN, CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST?: BALANCING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2004).
3. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 310.
4. Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 981, 992 (2004).
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genocide of religious minorities5 to rigid restrictions on churches’
6
governance and practice. Even more passively, it can take the form
of a government’s refusal to officially recognize a church (after
repeated applications for such recognition), thereby significantly
7
inhibiting the church’s ability to function as a church body.
The most severe restrictions on religious freedom leave no doubt
as to their violation of international human rights provisions as
embodied in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 9 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). However, because these documents
allow governments to limit religious freedom under certain
circumstances, less egregious impingements involve close questions as
to whether they are justifiable restrictions under the “necessity”
provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR.
This Article will examine whether the restrictions on religious
freedom found in a number of current legislative statutes around the
world—and defended on any of a number of the “necessity”
grounds—are justifiable under the necessity clauses of the ICCPR
8
and the ECHR. The focus of the Article will be on the manifestation
of religious belief, rather than on the freedom to believe privately
whatever one wishes (recognized by both instruments as a right that
may never be limited by government). Part I will describe the
relevant textual provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR, along with
commentary interpreting those texts, and will describe general
principles of law developed by the Human Rights Committee (HRC)
and the European Court of Human Rights (EC) in deciding cases
under the two instruments. Part II will describe and examine HRC
and EC case law as it has developed principles for evaluating whether
legislation restricting religious freedom is justifiable under the

5. See generally Nathan A. Adams, IV, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious
Liberty Beyond the Border, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2000) (providing detailed descriptions of
the slaughter of religious minorities in Armenia, Bosnia, and Sudan, as well as other instances of
slavery, forced labor, and torture of religious minorities).
6. See Philpott, supra note 4, at 991 (describing such practices in China during the mid to
late 1990s).
7. See Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep
306, 332 (2002) (holding that such a refusal did violate church members’ freedom of religion).
8. This Article will examine the laws of several states, but will not be concerned with
whether each state is bound by either the ICCPR or the ECHR. The concern is with certain
types of laws and whether they pass muster under these two significant human rights
instruments and the judicial bodies that exercise jurisdiction over the disputes arising under
them.
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necessity clauses. Part III will evaluate several current laws and argue
that certain recurring language in the laws is problematic under the
ICCPR and the ECHR. Part IV will describe and critique the
“principle of secularism” as a distinct justification for restricting
religious freedom. This Part will argue that the principle of
secularism as it is being defined and applied, particularly in EC
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient justification for restrictions on
religious freedom. Finally, Part V will consider the case of a Swedish
pastor who was convicted for preaching against homosexuality as a
test case for application of the laws discussed in Part III and the
principle of secularism discussed in Part IV. This part will contend
that the Swedish pastor’s conviction was not justifiable under the
ECHR and the ICCPR necessity clauses, and that to the extent the
laws discussed in Part III and the principle of secularism discussed in
Part IV can be read to proscribe the pastor’s sermon, they violate the
two instruments and should not be given effect.
I. THE ICCPR AND THE ECHR
A. The Right
Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR both declare
that everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion.9 Both also declare that this freedom is individual and

9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf
[hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 18 of the ICCPR states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
Id.; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
9, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter ECHR]. Article 9 of the ECHR states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
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collective, embracing the private, inner-life of religious belief (the
10
forum internum ), as well as the public manifestation of religious
belief, individually or in community, in the form of worship,
observance, practice, and teaching.11 The forum internum is inviolable
in both documents and subject to none of the possible limitations to
which the manifestation of religion is subject. Manfred Nowak calls
freedom of religion and belief in the private realm “passive” freedom,
in that states are prohibited “from dictating or forbidding confession
to or membership in a religion or belief.”12 The other part of this
private realm not subjected to restriction under the ICCPR is practice
that does not touch upon the freedom and sphere of privacy of others,
but instead “primarily relates to the practice of religious rituals and
customs in the home, either alone or in community with others.”13
The freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice, and teaching is the more public freedom of
religion that is subject to limitation under both Article 18 and Article
9. According to the EC, the freedom to manifest one’s religion
protects acts which are “intimately linked” to religious belief, “such
as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of a
religion or belief in a generally recognised form.”14 The term
“practice” does not, according to the Court, “cover any act which is
motivated or influenced by a religion or belief,” and one does not
necessarily have the right “to behave in the public sphere in a manner
dictated by a religion or a conviction.”15 According to Nowak,
worship under the ICCPR means the “typical form of religious prayer

2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
10. P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 541 (1998).
11. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18.; ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9.
12. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 317. This freedom, according to Nowak, not only confers the
right to select from among existing religions or beliefs but also includes the “negative freedom
not to belong to any such group or to live without religious confession.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
13. Id. at 319.
14. Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294, 307 (1997).
15. Id. Van Dijk and van Hoof say that while the European Commission on Human Rights
puts a “broad interpretation” on the terms “religion” and “belief,” “this does not mean that
every individual opinion or preference is a ‘religion or belief.’” Instead, the concept has in mind
views that “attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.” VAN DIJK
& VAN HOOF, supra note 10, at 548.

03__PARKER.DOC

2006]

3/9/2007 10:04 AM

THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST RELIGIOUS BELIEF

95

and preaching, i.e., freedom of ritual”; observance “covers
processions, wearing of religious clothing . . . , prayer and all other
customs and rites of the various religions”; and teaching “is
understood as every form of imparting the substance of a religion or
16
belief.” In the General Comments to the ICCPR, “practice” seems
to overlap with both observance and teaching, and includes the
“freedom to choose [] religious leaders, priests and teachers, the
freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom
to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.”17 Nowak, in
recognition of the need for “practice” not to include every action or
omission motivated by religion or belief, says, “Religious practice
may thus be said to be only that conduct obviously related to a
religious conviction.”18
B. The Restrictions
Because the public manifestation of religion has the potential to
interfere with the rights of others or to pose a danger to society, it is
not absolute. Using slightly different language, both Article 18 of the
ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR subject the manifestation of
religion or belief to such limitations that are “prescribed by law” and
are necessary in the interests of public safety to protect public order,
health, or morals, or to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms
19
The General Comments to Article 18 say that these
of others.
limitations are to be strictly interpreted such that only the listed
restrictions are allowed.20 Further, limitations must be “directly
related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are
predicated,” and “may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or
applied in a discriminatory manner.”21 One author points out that
almost all of the ICCPR limitation clauses use the word “necessary,”
indicating that restrictions on rights “are permissible only when they

16. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.
17. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought,
Conscience and Religion (Art. 18), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?Open
Document [hereinafter General Comment No. 22].
18. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.
19. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18, ¶ 3; ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9, ¶ 3.
20. General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, at ¶ 8.
21. Id.
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are essential, i.e., inevitable.”22 Accordingly, the EC has narrowly
construed the “prescribed by law” requirement in order to
circumvent hiding religious freedom violations behind domestic law.
In Kalaç v. Turkey, the Court said that the requirement is designed to
ensure “a measure of legal protection in domestic law against
arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights
safeguarded by paragraph 2.”23
C. Pluralism as Axiomatic
Both the EC and the HRC have indicated that the principle of
pluralism is fundamental when considering the justifiability of a
restriction on religious freedom.
The EC has indicated that
government restrictions on religious freedom may be necessary at
times in order to “reconcile the interests of differing groups and to
24
ensure respect for the convictions of all.” The “State must remain
neutral and impartial,” however, with an aim to the “maintenance of
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy,” rather than with
an aim to “remove the cause of the tensions by doing away with
pluralism.”25 In the context of the freedom of association, the
restriction of which requires justifications similar to Article 9, the EC
has said, “The autonomy of religious communities is in fact
indispensable to pluralism in a democratic society.”26
In Kokkinakis v. Greece and Manoussakis v. Greece, the EC even
more explicitly affirmed religious pluralism as a guiding principle
when answering the question of whether a law restricting religious
freedom is “necessary in a democratic society.” In Manoussakis, the
EC recognized a “margin of appreciation” in assessing whether
contracting states could restrict religious liberty, but noted that “[i]n
delimiting the extent of the margin of appreciation . . . the Court must
have regard to what is at stake, namely the need to secure true
religious pluralism, an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic

22. Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 308 (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981).
23. Kalaç v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep 552, 560 (1999).
24. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 306,
335 (2002) (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 419 (1994)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 336.
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society.”27 In Kokkinakis, the EC said that freedom of religion “is
one of the foundations of a democratic society” and “the pluralism
indissociable from a democratic society which has been dearly won
over the centuries depends on it.”28 The General Comments to
Article 18 of the ICCPR do not use the term pluralism, but require
that states parties proceed with an attitude of “equality and nondiscrimination” toward all religions.29 Further, in a dissenting opinion
in Westerman v. Netherlands, an HRC member argued that
“conscientious objection is based on a pluralistic conception of
society in which acceptance rather than coercion is the decisive
30
factor.”
Professor W. Cole Durham has called the principle of pluralism a
31
Professor
“fundamental axiom of international human rights.”
Michael McConnell, in analyzing U.S. religious liberty jurisprudence,
has advocated an “animating principle [of] pluralism and diversity”
over the “maintenance of a scrupulous secularism in all aspects of
public life touched by government” that in his view has too often
typified U.S. Supreme Court religious liberty jurisprudence.32 He has
also said, “My position is that the Religion Clauses do not create a
secular public sphere . . . . Rather, the purpose of the Religion
Clauses is to protect the religious lives of the people from
unnecessary intrusions of government, whether promoting or

27. Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 407 (1997) (citing
Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 418).
28. Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 418 (emphasis and punctuation removed). Though
Article 18 of the ICCPR does not contain the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” in its
limiting language, the idea of “necessity” is certainly present and seems to present the same
basic question as posed in the ECHR. In discussing the choice to leave out the particular phrase
in the ICCPR, one scholar has noted that, “It is difficult . . . to find a basis for concluding that
the omissions are significant.” Kiss, supra note 22, at 306. Alexandre Charles Kiss also offers
possible explanations for the omission while retaining the essential meaning of the phrase. See
id. at 490 n.67.
29. General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, ¶ 8.
30. Human Rights Comm. Decision, No. 682/1996, at ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/67/D/682/1996 (1999) (dissenting opinion by committee member H. Solari Yrigoyen).
31. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Pluralism as a Factor in Peace, 2003 FIDES ET
LIBERTAS 43, 44. Durham argues that pluralism is essential to peace, because peace in a
pluralistic world “is best maintained through building structures of mutual understanding and
respect.” Id. Arguing along similar lines, Nathan Adams says “religious tolerance may be
essential to ensure the continued viability of the international rule of law.” Adams, supra note
5, at 34. While Durham and Adams ultimately disagree as to the propriety of religious
“absolutism,” both see pluralism as essential to peace.
32. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.115, 116
(1992).
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hindering religion. It is to foster a regime of religious pluralism, as
33
distinguished from both majoritarianism and secularism.”
According to McConnell, his religious pluralism view of the religion
clauses in the U.S. Constitution contrasts with the Warren and Burger
34
Courts’ “mission to protect democratic society from religion.”
While this view is in specific reference to religious liberty in the
United States, it echoes the ECHR’s view of an “indissociable” union
35
between democratic society and religious pluralism.
The commentators mentioned above are careful to note that
protecting a robust pluralism does not require relativizing belief.
Durham specifically argues that states “should insist on tolerance and
mutual respect among citizens, but may not insist that believers
compromise or relativize their commitment to the truths in which
36
He warns against the view that would equate
they believe.”
exclusivist truth claims with “extremism,” and notes that a religious
community “can claim that its beliefs are true without believing that
its beliefs may be imposed on others.”37 McConnell similarly eschews
the idea that protecting pluralism means requiring religious claims to
be “tamed, cheapened, and secularized” in order to find a place
alongside the beliefs of fellow citizens in public life.38 Applying these
principles to the EC and HRC, one must not mistake the EC’s
recognition of the government’s role in ensuring “mutual tolerance”
as a requirement that religions relativize the fundamental tenets of
their religion. Indeed, in the context of freedom of expression, the

33. Id. at 117. Echoing the “autonomy of religious communities” sentiment of the ECHR,
McConnell adds that religious pluralism is “to preserve what Madison called the ‘full and equal
rights’ of religious believers and communities to define their own way of life, so long as they do
not interfere with the rights of others, and to participate fully and equally with their fellow
citizens in public life without being forced to shed their religious convictions and character.” Id.
(citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison, June 8,
1789)).
34. Id. at 120.
35. Note that the pluralistic view espoused by Durham, McConnell, and the ECHR should
not be confused with an “unimpaired flourishing” view of religious liberty, since a pluralistic
view of religion will still admit to government restriction in appropriate circumstances. See
generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74
TEX. L. REV. 577 (1996) (offering a very interesting critique of this view and an equally
interesting espousal of their “equal regard” religious liberty approach).
36. Durham, supra note 31, at 51.
37. Id.
38. McConnell, supra note 32, at 127. He says, “The Court does not object to a little
religion in our public life. But the religion must be tamed cheapened, and secularized . . . .
Authentic religion must be shoved to the margins of public life.” Id.
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Court has said that protection extends not only to popular views, “but
39
also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”
Accepting religious pluralism in principle does not answer the
more specific question of whether and to what extent government
may legitimately constrain religious freedom as an exercise of
necessity in particular cases. However, a commitment to genuine
religious pluralism should limit a government’s ability to restrict
religious freedom on the ground that public manifestation of religious
ideas or practice somehow constitute a per se threat to democratic
government. To the extent that pluralism as a prescriptive norm is
“indissociable” from democracy itself, a government restriction on
manifestations of religious belief—ostensibly because such a
restriction is “necessary” to protect that society—bears the burden of
showing that a true, identifiable necessity exists to justify the
restriction. Specifically, a government must show that curbing
religious freedom in a particular instance will not violate the
axiomatic principle of religious pluralism, and by extension,
democracy itself. Such a view does not preclude appropriately
specific justifications for curbing religious freedom, but guards against
an inversion of the principle that would view robust expression of
religious ideas and practice as somehow inimical to a democratic
society, and thus subject to restriction simply by virtue of its religious
nature or the content of the religious expression.
D. Margin of Appreciation and Level of Scrutiny
Finally, the EC and the HRC have had to determine how they
should apply these principles in particular cases. In order to “balance
general societal interests against the interests of the individual or
group adversely affected by the state’s action,” the EC has begun to
develop standards of review guided by its “margin of appreciation”
doctrine.40 Under the doctrine, national governments are given some
discretion as to the manner in which they implement ECHR rights.41
39. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/ 98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 36 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1, 32-33 (2003).
40. Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation:
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 391, 446, 451 (2001).
41. Id. at 451. Donoho calls the doctrine “one of the EC[]’s primary tools for
accommodating diversity, national sovereignty, and the will of domestic majorities, while
enforcing effective implementation of rights under the European Convention.” Id. The EC has
noted that the substance of the notion of public order “varied on account of national
characteristics.” Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 405 (1997).
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When a state’s law falls “within a predictably amorphous range of
acceptable alternatives,” the Court is likely to uphold the state’s law
42
Similarly, the HRC has
as within the margin of appreciation.
indicated its willingness to look at “context” in assessing alleged
violations of the ICCPR. In Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, the
Committee concluded that there had been a violation of Article 18 of
the ICCPR, and noted that it had reached its decision “duly taking
43
into account the specifics of the context.”
While the margin of appreciation recognizes the freedom of
European states to exercise some measure of sovereignty, the level of
discretion given to the national government depends to a large degree
44
on the content of the right at issue. The more fundamental the right,
the more specifically the limitation must be tailored to the aim sought
and the more the means chosen must be proportional to a legitimate
end.45 The scrutiny encouraged by the ICCPR is similar in its
requirement that a restriction on religious liberty be “proportional in
46
severity and intensity to the purpose being sought.” Importantly for
purposes of this Article, the EC has specified that restrictions on
47
religious freedom “call for very strict scrutiny by the Court.” Thus,
while the Court will consider the margin of appreciation and take
restrictions on religious freedom on a case-by-case basis because of

42. Donoho, supra note 40, at 452.
43. Human Rights Comm. Decision, No. 931/2000, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2005) (holding that a practicing Muslim woman had a right to wear her
headscarf during classes at a state institution). One of the dissenters in the case agreed with the
need “to take into account the context in which the restrictions contemplated by those clauses
[the “necessity” clauses contained in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, and 22] are applied” but criticized
the Committee for saying that it had taken context into account when the state party offered no
explanation for the basis on which it was seeking to justify the restriction on religious dress. Id.
at Individual Opinion (dissenting) by Comm. Member Sir Nigel Rodley.
44. See Donoho, supra note 40, at 454-55. Donoho says the ECHR has developed a
“hierarchy of rights, deeming some so fundamental to a democratic society that little discretion
is allowed to national governments.” Id.
45. See id. at 454. Donoho also notes that “the Court’s jurisprudence for balancing
individual and state interests is strikingly similar to that utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court
when faced with similar issues.” Id. at 454 n.179.
46. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 325 (emphasis removed). One commentator has urged the
formation of an international compelling interest test in order to limit the justifications a state
can offer for restricting religious freedom. He says such a test “presumptively excludes
justifications for violations of religious liberty on grounds of subversion, order, immorality, or
disrespect for religion or a religious figure, while permitting the state to demonstrate compelling
reasons for departing from this rule to address internationally recognized problems like
terrorism, sectarian violence, and female genital mutilation.” Adams, supra note 5, at 63.
47. Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 407 (1997)
(emphasis added).
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the inherently fact-sensitive balancing between the right and the
government necessity, the government bears the heavy burden of
showing that a limitation is actually “necessary” and that it is
narrowly tailored toward that necessary end.
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION: SPECIFIC CASES48
Before moving to an assessment of current laws in light of the
above-mentioned general principles, the Article now proceeds to a
brief examination of specific EC cases that have considered when and
if a restriction on religious freedom meets the necessity requirements.
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the EC found that
the government’s refusal to officially recognize the Church of
49
Bessarabia was an interference with its freedom of religion. The EC
said that the government was pursuing a legitimate aim of protecting
against the revival of long-standing rivalries between Russia and
Romania which could endanger the social peace and territorial
integrity of Moldova.50 However, refusal to recognize the applicant
church was not a legitimate means to fulfill this aim because the
government was not acting neutrally and impartially, its concerns
about national security and territorial integrity were “purely
hypothetical,” and the significant consequences for religious freedom
were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.51 Thus, the EC
upheld the ICCPR and ECHR requirement that a restriction be
proportionate to its goal.
In Manoussakis v. Greece, the EC found a violation of Article 9
when Jehovah’s Witnesses were prosecuted for “establish[ing] and
operat[ing] a place of worship without first obtaining the
authorization[] required by law.”52 The government argued that the
authorization measures, which included the Greek Orthodox Church
in the approval process and criminalized the use of a non-authorized
place of worship, served to protect public order and the rights of
others.53 This was the case, the government contended, because the
Orthodox church had played a vital role in Greek history, because

48. Research for this Article did not uncover any significant HRC cases for this particular
section. The discussion on secularism below does include several HRC cases.
49. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep., 306,
332 (2002).
50. Id. at 334.
51. Id. at 339-41.
52. Manoussakis, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 387.
53. Id. at 405.
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virtually the entire population of Greece was Christian Orthodox, and
because “sects sought to manifest their ideas and doctrines using all
sorts of ‘unlawful and dishonest’ means,” and were “socially
dangerous.”54 The EC said that “States are entitled to verify whether
a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of
religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population,” and
held that the protection of public order was a legitimate aim under
55
the circumstances. However, the EC held that Article 9 had been
violated because the law had been used to “impose rigid, or indeed
prohibitive, conditions on practice of religious beliefs by certain nonorthodox movements” and “to restrict the activities of faiths outside
the Orthodox church.”56 The EC concluded by saying that the
convictions had such a “direct effect on . . . freedom of religion that
[they] cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued, nor, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society.”57
The case illustrates the limits of the margin of appreciation doctrine
when the impact on religious freedom is direct and not narrowly
tailored to a legitimate aim.
In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the EC overturned the conviction of a
Jehovah’s Witness who was convicted of improper proselytism after
he and his wife engaged in a religious discussion with a woman in his
58
home. The government argued that it had to “protect a person’s
religious beliefs and dignity from attempts to influence them by
immoral and deceitful means.”59 The EC made a distinction between
bearing “Christian witness and improper proselytism,” with the
former involving “true evangelism” and the latter involving improper
pressure and possibly even the “use of violence [and] brainwashing.”60
The EC said that the Greek law was proper insofar as it was designed
to punish only the latter, but that Greece had not sufficiently
specified the way in which the applicant “had attempted to convince
61
his neighbor by improper means.” The EC thus concluded that the
applicant’s conviction was not justified “by a pressing social need”

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 409.
Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 397 (1994).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id.
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and that the law was not “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
62
or . . . for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
In Valsamis v. Greece, a Jehovah’s Witness student in the state
secondary education school refused to take part in the celebration of
the National Day school parade commemorating the outbreak of war
63
Her parents contended that
between Greece and Italy in 1940.
pacifism is a “fundamental tenet of their religion and forbids [even
64
indirect] conduct or practice associated with war.” The school had
previously exempted her from attendance at religious education
lessons and Orthodox Mass, but suspended her from school for one
day for failure to attend the parade.65 The applicant argued that
Article 9 guaranteed her right to the “negative freedom not to
manifest, by gestures of support, any convictions or opinions contrary
to her own” and that the punishment “stigmatised and marginalised
her.”66 The EC rejected the argument and held that Article 9 did not
confer a right to exemption from disciplinary rules which were
applied generally and neutrally, and that there had been no
interference with her right to manifest her religion.67 The ECHR
Commission decision from which the student appealed had noted that
Article 9 protects “only acts and gestures of individuals which really
express the conviction in question.”68
In Hasan v. Bulgaria, Muslim believers sought to replace the
leadership of their religious organization, thereby causing divisions in
the Muslim community.69 Soon thereafter, the Bulgarian government
declared the election of the leader of one of the factions null and
void, removed him from the position, and set up a temporary
governing body pending the election of a new permanent Muslim
leader.70 The applicants argued that the religious community should
62. Id.
63. Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294, 298 (1997).
64. Id. at 297.
65. Id. at 298.
66. Id. at 317.
67. Id. In A. v. United Kingdom, the EC rejected a claim of exemption from paying taxes,
some of which would be used to fund the military, on pacifist grounds. The EC said that the
obligation to pay taxes is “a general one which has no specific conscientious implications in
itself . . . Article 9 does not confer . . . the right to refuse on the basis of her convictions to abide
by legislation . . . which applies neutrally and generally in the public sphere, without impinging
on the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 9.” A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10295/82, 6 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 558 (1984).
68. Valsamis, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 306.
69. App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339, 1347 (2002).
70. Id.
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be allowed to organize according to its own rules, including choosing
71
its own leaders. The government argued that it “had a duty to
maintain a climate of tolerance and mutual respect” between
independent religious institutions, and that the state’s functioning in
this capacity had no bearing on the Muslims’ right to practice their
religion.72 The EC ruled against the Bulgarian government, noting
that religious communities traditionally exist in organized structures
and find meaning in religious ceremonies and the religious ministers
conducting those ceremonies73: “Participation in the life of the
community is thus a manifestation of one’s religion.”74 The EC also
noted that “but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of
religion . . . excludes any discretion on the part of the State to
determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such
75
beliefs are legitimate.” The EC held that the interference was not
“prescribed by law” in that it was “arbitrary and was based on legal
provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive,
and did not meet the required standards of clarity and
foreseeability.”76
This short list of cases shows the EC’s commitment to impose
exacting scrutiny on any restrictions to religious freedom, particularly
with regard to the proportionality test. If a government is pursuing a
legitimate aim, but is doing so by direct proscription of religious
freedom when other means may be available, the law will not stand.
However, Valsamis indicates that the Court will not defer to religious
sensibilities when the law does not explicitly restrict one’s right to
manifest religion, but is instead a generally applicable law that
requires what the Court views as rather innocuous participation in a
public function. The Article now moves to an analysis of whether
legislation currently on the books in certain states, and ostensibly
grounded in the “necessity” exceptions of the ICCPR and ECHR, is
in fact faithful to the tenets of those documents and the jurisprudence
interpreting them.

71. Id. at 1357.
72. Id. at 1357-58.
73. Id. at 1358-59.
74. Id. at 1359.
75. Id. at 1362. “State action favoring one leader of a divided religious community or
undertaken with the purpose of forcing the community to come together under a single
leadership against its own wishes” is an interference with freedom of religion. Id.
76. Id. at 1365.
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III. LEGISLATION “NECESSARY TO PROTECT PUBLIC
SAFETY, ORDER, HEALTH, OR MORALS OR THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF OTHERS”
A. Legislation
Silvio Ferrari says that in the last ten to twenty years a new breed
of religiously motivated terrorists, willing to kill in the name of God,
77
has appeared. This reality has occasioned a pressing need to find a
balance between the values of freedom and security, to determine
how to “reconcile religious freedom and national security in a way
that makes it possible to simultaneously enjoy them both.”78 Many
governments around the world have adopted measures that are
ostensibly “necessary to ensure national security and public order,
and life, health, morals, rights and freedoms of other citizens” are
protected from extremist religions or religious ideas.79 Ferrari
identifies three broad types of government intrusion into religious
liberty since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States: (1) government creation of laws restricting a variety of
fundamental rights that indirectly affect religious liberty, such as laws
making it more difficult to obtain visas, thereby inhibiting missionary
activities; (2) government scrutiny of religious organizations,
including the examination of internal operations of religious
organizations to ascertain whether the organization might be a front
for terrorist activity; and (3) government intrusion into religious
beliefs, such as the investigation of subversive doctrine that is
“tainted with intolerance, and opposes the democratic fundamentals
of civil society.”80

77. Silvio Ferrari, Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe After
September 11, 2004 BYU L. REV. 357, 358.
78. Id. at 359.
79. See, e.g., The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Freedom of Worship and
Religious Organizations (New Version) art. 3, as published in NARODNOYE SLOVO (Tashkent,
Uzb.), May 15, 1998, translated in http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/uzbeklaw.html.
80. Ferrari, supra note 77, at 361.
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Examples of such restrictive legislation abound.81 In Russia, the
82
Federal Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity forbids “the
creation and operation of social and religious associations or other
associations which have goals or actions directed at the conduct of
83
extremist activity.”
Such prohibited extremist activities include
“propaganda of exclusivity, advocating either supremacy or
inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion, social, racial, national,
84
religious or linguistic affiliation.” This prohibition is not limited
under the law to those acts committed in public, and one
commentator contends that religious groups could face extremism
accusations based on private doctrinal discussions during regular
worship services if the group claims exclusive truth based on the
“superiority” of its doctrine.85
Another example is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
enacted in Singapore in 1990.86 For the purpose of protecting
religious harmony (and by extension public safety, order, and so on),
the Act gives the state the power to issue a restraining order against
any religious representative who excites “disaffection against the
President or the Government while, or under the guise of,
propagating or practising any religious belief.”87 Such an order can
restrain the religious representative from addressing a congregation
or publishing any text without prior permission of the state
authorities.88

81. In addition to the legislation specifically discussed, testimony before the Congressional
Human Rights Caucus indicated that Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and some states in India have all
passed or are considering passing anti-conversion legislation that threatens prosecution for
sharing one’s faith with another. Anti-Conversion Legislation in India: Staff Briefing Before the
Congressional Human Rights Caucus & Task Force for Int’l Religious Freedom, July 21, 2006
(statement of Angela C. Wu, Dir. of Int’l Advocacy, the Becket Fund), available at
http://becketfund.org/files/581fd.pdf [hereinafter Wu].
82. Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection
of Legislation] 2002, No. 30, Item 3031.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, Chapter 167A, available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (Search “Go To Cap No.” for “167A”) (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). See
also Ferrari, supra note 77, at 369-70.
87. Ferrari, supra note 77, at 369-70.
88. Id. The Bulgarian Consolidated Draft Law on Religious Denominations is an example
of a more procedurally focused effort to curtail religious activity by, among other things,
enacting very difficult registration procedures applied to non-Bulgarian Orthodox churches
where non-registration makes practicing one’s religion freely virtually impossible. For a
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A third example of legislation limiting religious liberty using the
necessity language of the ICCPR and the ECHR is the Law of the
Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Worship and Religious
Organizations.89 The law lays out numerous guarantees of religious
freedom that are qualified with significant restrictions in the name of
national security, public order, life, health, morals, and rights and
freedoms of others. For example, Article 5 of the law outlaws
“actions aimed at converting believers of one religion into another”
and declares inadmissible “the use of religion for anti-state and anticonstitutional propaganda . . . and for other actions against the state,
90
society and individual.”
Finally, since at least 1998, France has actively sought to restrict
the development of new religious movements (NRMs). In 2000, the
French National Assembly unanimously approved a law that created
a civil mechanism for the dissolution of religious entities, placed
restrictions on the locations of specified “new religious movements,”
prohibited dissemination of information regarding new religious
movements, and criminalized “mental manipulation” or
91
The effects of this and other initiatives targeting
brainwashing.
religious minorities include, among other things, harassment in the
workplace, harassment at school, heightened investigations of
religious organizations’ financial management systems, imposition of
excessive taxes on donations to religious organizations, and denial of
child custody to a parent based on the parent’s religion.92

discussion of the law, see Atanas Krussteff, An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian
Legislation in the Field of Religious Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 575, 589-600.
89. See The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Freedom of Worship and Religious
Organizations, supra note 79.
90. Grant Garrard Beckwith, Note, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious
Liberty—An Appraisal of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations,” 2000 BYU L. REV. 997, 1042.
91. Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], June 13, 2001, p. 9337; see also Hannah Clayson Smith, Note,
Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternite at Risk For New Religious Movements in France, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 1099, 1118-22.
92. Smith, supra note 91, at 1116-17 nn.95-101 (detailing instances of each of these effects
and noting at least eleven cases in which mothers were denied custody of children in divorce
proceedings because they were members of a NRM).
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B. Legitimate or Illegitimate Restrictions on Religious Freedom?
1.

Facially Invalid?

a. Overbreadth and Vagueness.
The initial question in
evaluating the laws laid out in Part III.A. is whether, to borrow
categories from U.S. constitutional law, the laws are facially invalid
under the ICCPR or the ECHR. In the United States, a plaintiff may
challenge the facial validity of a law regulating speech by arguing that
93
it is either unconstitutionally overbroad or unconstitutionally vague.
Overbreadth requires a showing that a law punishes a “‘substantial’
amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s
94
plainly legitimate sweep.’” Such a showing invalidates the entire law
“out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law
may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially
when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.”95
Overbreadth is rarely found, however, because the U.S. Supreme
Court recognizes that blocking application of a law to constitutionally
unprotected speech, or especially to constitutionally unprotected
conduct, could have substantial social costs. Thus, the “strong
medicine” of overbreadth invalidation is used sparingly.96
The related doctrine of vagueness allows a challenge to a law
that is not a “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed

93. It is important to note that while overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply primarily,
if not exclusively, to freedom of speech in U.S. jurisprudence, international law protections of
freedom of religion specifically include manifestations involving speech, namely teaching
religious points of view. See NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321. One commentator has noted that
international law “expressly links religious liberty with virtually every major human right,
including, inter alia, freedom of association, freedom of speech, the norm of non-discrimination,
[and] due process.” Adams, supra note 5, at 23.
94. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
95. Id. at 119. This chilling effect may cause people to “abstain from protected speech—
harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas.” Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 120. The Court says, “Rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily
associated with speech,” thus limiting the doctrine to content-based legislation. Id. at 124.
Sullivan and Gunther question whether the overbreadth doctrine functions as “simply one
application of strict scrutiny” to the extent that overbreadth cases typically emphasize the
availability of more carefully tailored means to achieve legislative ends, a hallmark of strict
scrutiny analysis. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1298-99 (14th ed. 2001).
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conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”97
Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald Gunther point out that the doctrine
draws on the procedural due process requirement of adequate notice,
but is also aimed at preventing selective enforcement.98 The Court
has said the purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to prevent “arbitrary
99
It has found laws
and discriminatory enforcement” of a law.
unconstitutional for vagueness where essentially “no standard of
conduct is specified at all,” and as a result “‘men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning.’”100
b. “Prescribed by Law” Though the ICCPR and the ECHR
use the phrase “prescribed by law” rather than overbreadth and
vagueness, the terms have analogous aspects. In Kokkinakis v.
Greece, the applicant argued that the absence of any description of
the “objective substance” of the offense of proselytism “would tend
to make it possible for any kind of religious conversation or
communication to be caught by the provision” and that the vague
language risked “extendability” by the police and the courts to
permissible exercises of religious freedom.101 The EC rejected this
contention, noting “that the wording of many statutes is not
absolutely precise” and “that many laws are inevitably couched in
terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague.”102 The EC
further noted that the existence of a body of settled national case law
sufficiently enabled the applicant to regulate his conduct according to
the law.103 Though the Court rejected the overbreadth and vagueness
contention, its discussion indicates the possibility that a law may be
struck down under the ECHR if it does not sufficiently enable
citizens to regulate their conduct under the law.104
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the EC
further explained the concept of “prescribed by law,” saying:
[T]he expression ‘prescribed by law’ . . . not only requires that an
impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law, but also
refers to the quality of the law in question, which must be

97. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
98. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 96, at 1299.
99. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974).
100. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Const.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
101. App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 419 (1994).
102. Id. at 420.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is to say, formulated
with sufficient precision to enable the individual . . . to regulate his
105
conduct.

To meet these requirements, a domestic law “must afford a measure
of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public
authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention . . . .
Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope
of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the
106
manner of its exercise.”
Thus, as with the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines, the “prescribed by law” requirement of both the
ECHR and the ICCPR guards against laws that do not provide
sufficient warning as to what conduct the law proscribes.
c. “Necessary.” Another way to challenge facial validity under
the ICCPR or the ECHR would be to argue that the law in question
could never be necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others or, to use the
language of the ECHR, the law could never be “necessary in a
democratic society.”107 Thus, it must be struck down as facially
invalid.
d. Analysis of National Legislation for Facial Invalidity. A
facial validity challenge depends upon the specific wording of the
statute in question. For this reason, the analysis here will assess the
facial validity of the several representative statutes described above.
Turning first to the question of necessity, none of the statutes would
likely fail as facially invalid under the ICCPR or ECHR on the
ground that the restrictions could never be necessary in a democratic
society. One could imagine any number of scenarios under which
even the most restrictive language of the statutes might be necessary.
For example, Russia’s Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity
forbids “propaganda of exclusion, advocating either supremacy or
108
One can easily
inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion.”
imagine a situation in which members of one religion might propagate

105. App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep 306, 333 (2002). The Court has also described the
concept as providing “a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary
interferences by public authorities.” Kalaç v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep 552,
560 (1999).
106. Metro. Church of Bessarabia, 35 H. R. Rep. at 333.
107. See ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9, ¶ 2.
108. See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation of
Collection of Legislation] 2002 No. 30, Item 3031.
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their religious beliefs in such a demeaning or aggressive way that
others’ fundamental rights—to privacy or to their own religious
freedom—are violated. On a broader scale, the tensions that
sometimes exist between religions could, based upon active spreading
of disparaging ideas about a competing religion, lead to unrest that
threatens the public order or safety. It would then be necessary for
the government to restrict such propaganda and advocacy.109 Further,
research for this Article did not discover a single case in which a law
was declared facially invalid on this ground.
Although vagueness and overbreadth are closer questions, the
examples referenced here would likely survive an overbreadth
challenge as well. Though the laws might apply to religious
expression that the government could not in some cases justify
restricting, the plainly legitimate sweep of these laws in relation to
that possibility would likely protect them from an overbreadth
challenge. The exception to this conclusion would be the Uzbek
provision prohibiting “actions aimed at converting believers from one
110
In Kokkinakis, the EC expressly allowed
religion to another.”
proselytizing where a religious believer expressed his ideas in an
inoffensive way, and there was no evidence that he had taken
advantage of the “inexperienced, feebleness of mind, and
111
Thus, a blanket ban on
ingenuousness” of the other person.
attempting to convert another, without specifying what would
constitute an impropriety, might fail a facial validity challenge based
on overbreadth.
The vagueness question, with which the ECHR has dealt
explicitly, may be a closer question because a religious organization
or one of its members could easily have difficulty determining what
activities or teaching of its religion might count as “exclusionary” or
“anti-state.” For example, imagine that a debate occurred between
an atheist and a Christian at a public institution. Suppose the atheist
argued that being a moral person and having a theoretical basis for
moral opinions does not require belief in a higher power. In
response, the Christian argued that a philosophically sound moral
system requires the existence of a higher power. He went on to argue
that among the higher power “options,” the God of Christianity is the

109. A similar argument would apply to the restrictions on NRMs in France and the antipropaganda provisions of the Singapore law. See supra notes 91, 86.
110. See Beckwith, supra note 90.
111. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 414 (1994).
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most rational explanation for a moral system and for being a moral
person. Assume also that the Christian did not explicitly condemn
other religious viewpoints, nor did he attempt to persuade audience
members to convert to Christianity. The aim was a religious
explanation for morality, held out as superior to other religious or
non-religious explanations.
The question with respect to vagueness (or “prescribed by law”)
is whether the law is “formulated with sufficient precision” to enable
112
citizens to regulate conduct accordingly. It is not clear whether the
foregoing example of the debate at a public institution could be
prosecuted as extremist under Russia’s law prohibiting “propaganda
of exclusivity, advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens
on the basis of religion,” because the statute is not clear about these
terms.113 As such, the law does not put the Christian debater
sufficiently on notice that he could be prosecuted. The Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty criticized Sweden’s Law Against Expression of
Disrespect on similar “no objective assessment” grounds: “This law
prohibits the expression of ‘disrespect’ towards favored minority
groups” but “lacks any objective standard for identifying
disrespect.”114 A similar lack of objective standard exists with regard
to “exclusion” in the Russia statute, “propaganda” in the Uzbekistan
115
Even so, it is
statute, and “disaffection” in the Singapore statute.
not clear that the EC would invalidate any of these measures on
vagueness grounds given its care to note that laws cannot account for
every eventuality.116 Further, because the language in each of the
statutes can be construed as furthering a legitimate aim of
government (proscribing treatment of other citizens as inferior on the
basis of religion), it is unlikely they would be struck down as facially
invalid on vagueness grounds. Rather than invalidating a law based
on necessity, overbreadth, or vagueness, it can be predicted that the

112. Metro. Church of Bessarabia, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 306, 333 (2002).
This is, of course, a separate question from the question of whether the prohibition’s aim is
legitimate even if it is not vague.
113. See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2002 No. 30, Item 3031.
114. Peng Voong, Speech at the United Nations 61st Comm’n on Human Rights (April 14,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/386.html).
115. See Part III.A for the full language of each of these statutes.
116. Metro. Church of Bessarabia, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 333 (“The level of precision
required of domestic legislation—which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality—
depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field which it
is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed.”).
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EC would want to adjudicate an “as-applied” claim to determine the
necessity of the statute under the particular circumstances, and
whether any conviction under the statute was proportional to the aim
pursued.
2. Invalid “As-Applied”? The nature of an “as-applied”
inquiry depends on the facts of particular cases.
However,
hypothetical situations to which these laws may apply can be
117
instructive. It seems clear that Russia’s prohibition on “exclusion,”
for example, could easily be applied to proscribe the Christian
debater’s claim that Christianity is a superior basis for morality as
compared to other religions. It is equally clear that such an
application would violate the ICCPR and the ECHR. Insofar as the
speech was an explanation of a religiously motivated belief, the EC
would probably rule as it did in Kokkinakis by saying that expression
of religious conviction absent overt pressure or coercion cannot be
punished as criminal.118 Further, prosecution of such a manifestation
of religious belief would likely be scrutinized very closely, in part
because it would constitute a “direct effect” on freedom of religion.
As such, it would violate the principle of proportionality unless the
necessity the government puts forth was closely connected to a
legitimate aim (and the more direct the restriction, the more difficult
this is to show). The debater would have to show that the views he
expressed in the speech were intimately tied to his religious belief,
since not every opinion or preference qualifies as a belief under the
instruments.119 Because the speech involved “some coherent view on
fundamental problems”120 and was “obviously related to religious
conviction,”121 he would satisfy this requirement. Thus, to justify
prosecuting the debater, the government would have to show some
specific necessity, under the circumstances, that made the restriction
necessary.122

117. See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2002 No. 30, Item 3031.
118. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 414 (1994).
119. See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 10.
120. Id.
121. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.
122. The Article discusses in detail below the question of whether such a speech at a public
institution would qualify as an endorsement of a particular religious view and thus as
proscribable to protect the secular nature of the state. On the facts of this hypothetical, such a
debate would not be seen as an endorsement by the school due to the nature of debate.
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Beyond this particular hypothetical, the Singapore Maintenance
of Religious Harmony Act’s prohibition of exciting disaffection could
easily be applied to restrain religiously motivated opposition to
government policy or practice.123 Because many religious traditions
(not to mention democratic principles generally) view actively
opposing unjust or immoral government action or cultural tendencies
as essential to their mission, this proscription could easily curtail
important religious freedoms. In addition, many traditions actively
attempt to persuade individuals and government of the correctness of
their views on a whole host of issues that touch the political arena.
Much of this activity could be viewed under these laws as subversive,
and thus proscribable merely for being in conflict with a government
policy or declaration. What if a citizen of the United States opposed
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the
Court struck down a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy, and
distributed fliers in the community condemning the decision and
expressing moral disagreement with homosexual sodomy?124 Under
the language at issue, the government could easily construe the act as
spreading disaffection against the government. However, such
activity is expressly allowable under the ICCPR, and without some
justification beyond the substantive religious disagreement, such as
advocacy of violence, other forms of disruptive dissent, or violation of
others’ rights, the restriction would violate the instrument.125
Similarly, while France’s NRM law allows dissolution of new
religious entities ostensibly to guard against abuse of the religious
freedoms of others, a government’s power of heightened investigation
and dissolution of religious entities simply because they are new
illegitimately restricts religious freedom absent some particularized
126
In addition, singling out members of
necessity for the restriction.
NRMs for individualized restriction simply because of membership in
a minority religious group, without showing a specific “pressing social
need,” is illegitimate.127 By extension, such restrictions restrain the
freedom of those who may want to convert to an NRM, thus causing a
123. See Ferrari, supra note 77, at 370 for the text of the Singapore statute.
124. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
125. See General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, ¶ 7.
126. Id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 8 (stating that necessity clauses are exhaustive, such that
restrictions not listed are not allowed); see also Smith, supra note 91 (giving examples of
restrictions on the locations of new religious movements in France).
127. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 422 (1994) (holding
that the government must show that the applicant’s conviction was justified in the circumstances
by a pressing social need).
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substantial violation of a person’s freedom to believe what he or she
wants and the freedom to belong to the religion of one’s choice. The
treatment of religious minority groups in France is exactly the type of
religious discrimination that the ICCPR and the ECHR forbid. The
language of these laws and others like them, while probably not
facially invalid, pose serious risks of restricting religious activity for
reasons other than the necessity required under the ICCPR and the
ECHR. Whether the laws are ultimately compatible with the
instruments in practice depends in large part on whether the
governments administering them actually require a showing of
necessity before pursuing prosecutions for religious expression under
those laws. Given the phraseology of many of the laws and the ways
they have been put into practice thus far in places like France, it
cannot be predicted that the ICCPR and the ECHR’s protections for
religious expression will be properly followed, and the broad
language of the laws will be at least partly to blame.
IV. THE “PRINCIPLE OF SECULARISM”
A. Legislation and Case Law
In addition to laws curtailing religious freedom under the specific
necessities of the ICCPR and the ECHR, some governments justify
curtailing religious freedom under the “principle of secularism.” This
principle contains the notion that government and society must be
protected from religious overreaching in order to preserve the secular
nature of government and the public. For example, France’s “law on
secularism” went into effect on September 2, 2004 and reads as
follows: “In public [primary and secondary schools], the wearing of
symbols or clothing through which the pupils ostensibly manifest a
religious appearance is prohibited.”128 Since then, a total of fortyeight students have been expelled under the law, most of them
Muslim girls who refused to remove their religious headscarves in
class.129 In banning the wearing of religious symbols, one French
official said that one purpose of the law was to encourage “mutual

128. France—Banning Religious Attire—United Shiks, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/96.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). See also
Law No. 2004-228 of March 3, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], March 17, 2004, p. 5190.
129. See
French
Schools
Expel
48
Over
Headscarf
Ban,
EXPATICA,
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=58&story_id=15996 (last visited Oct.
5, 2006).
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respect,” thus implying that wearing a religious symbol to school is
130
Similarly, in 2003, a
disrespectful to those of other religions.
Swedish pastor was convicted and sentenced to one month
imprisonment under a Swedish law banning disrespectful speech.131
Though the principle of secularism was not invoked explicitly in the
case, the idea of protecting others from offense and disrespect echoes
one of France’s justifications for its “secularism” laws.
While research for this Article did not identify any HRC cases
dealing explicitly with this issue, the HRC has indirectly considered
the question in one case. In Riley v. Canada, the Committee found in
favor of the Canadian Government, which had allowed a Sikh
member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to wear his
turban in place of the traditional “mountie” Stetson and forage cap
that comprised the standard uniform.132 Two retired RCMP officers
brought the complaint, arguing that the display of such a symbol by
the national police constituted a state endorsement of religion by
granting “special status” to the Sikh adherent. The officers claimed
that in order to protect their rights under Article 18 of the Covenant,
“the State should remain secular.”133 In rather conclusory fashion, the
Committee held that “the authors [of the complaint] have failed to
show how the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant has been
affected by allowing a Khals Sikh officer to wear religious symbols.”134
In so holding, the HRC rejected the idea that a “principle of
secularism” required prohibiting a manifestation of religious belief by
a member of a state-controlled institution.135
In a similar clash, Turkey removed the air force high command’s
director of legal affairs for “having adopted unlawful fundamentalist

130. Id.
131. See Sweden—Criminalizing Religious Speech—Åke Green, BECKET FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/93.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2006); see also discussion infra, Part V.
132. Decision of the Human Rights Comm., No. 1048/2002, ¶ 4.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/74/D/1048/2002 (2002).
133. Id. ¶ 3.3.
134. Id. ¶ 4.2.
135. Interestingly, in Goldman v. Weinberger, the U.S. Supreme Court gave significantly
more deference to military regulations that interfere with the rights of service personnel. 475
U.S. 503, 509 (1986). The Court held that prohibiting a Jewish commissioned officer from
wearing a yarmulke under an air force dress code regulation did not violate his religious liberty.
Id. at 504. The regulations “reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the
military’s perceived need for uniformity. The First Amendment therefore does not prohibit
them from being applied to petitioner even though their effect is to restrict the wearing of the
headgear required by his religious beliefs.” Id. at 510.
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opinions.”136 The Turkish government argued that the dismissal
constituted a disciplinary sanction for failure to “uphold the secular
137
In upholding the dismissal, the EC said, in
nature of the state.”
Kalaç v. Turkey, that the compulsory retirement was not an
interference with the freedom of religion or belief, but “was intended
to remove from the military legal service a person who had
manifested his lack of loyalty to the foundation of the Turkish nation,
namely secularism, which it was the task of the armed forces to
guarantee.”138
Following Kalaç, in Başpinar v. Turkey, the EC found that the
discharge of a non-commissioned officer of the army was not a
139
violation of his rights under Article 9 of the ECHR. The applicant
contended that his dismissal was based on his religious convictions
and the fact that his wife attempted to get a social security card with a
photograph showing her carrying an Islamic scarf.140 The government
asserted as its grounds for dismissal the applicant’s membership in
sects known to have “unlawful fundamentalist tendencies,” his
attendance at “ideological” meetings, and his disciplinary offences
while in the army. According to Turkey, “any attitude or conduct
such as the applicant’s antisocial character or his wife’s . . . Islamic
scarf had not been taken as the sole basis for his discharge from the
army.”141
In response, the applicant argued that the principle of secularism
should guarantee freedom of religion and conscience rather than
142
The EC
operating as a bar to manifestation of religious belief.
recognized that religion is one of the foundations of a democratic
society, but said that where “several religions coexist within one and
the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this
freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and
ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”143 Further,
The Court considers that in choosing to pursue a military career the
applicant was accepting of his own accord a system of military
discipline that by its very nature implied the possibility of placing

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Kalaç v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 552, 552 (1997).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 563.
App. No. 45631/99, 36 Eur H.R. Rep. CD1 (2003).
Id. at CD4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at CD5.
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on certain of the rights and freedoms of the members of the armed
144
forces limitations which could not be imposed on civilians.

The EC said that states may forbid “an attitude inimical to an
established order reflecting the requirements for military service” and
require “a duty for military personnel to refrain from participating in
the Islamic fundamentalist movement.”145 Finally, the EC noted with
approval that the Supreme Military Council’s dismissal order was not
based on religious beliefs or opinions or performance of religious
duties, but rather on “his conduct and activities in breach of military
146
discipline and the principle of secularism.”
The EC has also developed the principle of secularism in
analyzing alleged violations of Article 11 of the ECHR, which
delineates the freedom of assembly and association and uses
147
limitation language similar to that of Article 9. In Refah Partisi (the
Welfare Party) v. Turkey, the EC rejected a challenge brought under
Article 11 by a Turkish political party that had been dissolved by
Turkish authorities.148 The European court noted that the Turkish
Constitutional Court dissolved the party, and banned its leaders from
holding similar office in any other party for five years, “on the ground
that it had become a ‘centre’ of activities contrary to the principles of
149
In support of the holding, the Constitutional Court
secularism.”
cited numerous speeches given by members of the party advocating
violent overthrow of the government.150 The Turkish court also noted
that “secularism was one of the indispensable conditions of
democracy” and that “[i]ntervention by the State to preserve the

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at CD6 (emphasis added).
147. According to the ECHR,
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
ECHR, supra note 9, art. 11.
148. App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003).
149. Id. at 9
150. Id. at 13-17.
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secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary
151
in a democratic society.” Further,
Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious
matters cannot be regarded as interference contrary to the
requirements of a democratic society . . . . Secularism, which is also
the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the philosophical
essence of life in Turkey. Within a secular State religious feelings
simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and
legislative provisions. Those are not matters to which religious
152
requirements and thought apply.

The EC held in favor of the Turkish government, and in doing so
discussed the relationship between democracy and religion. First, the
Court reiterated the necessity of placing restrictions on religion “in
order to reconcile the interests of various groups and ensure that
153
everyone’s beliefs are respected.” Second, it noted “the State’s role
as the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of various
religions, faiths and beliefs,” but found that this duty “is incompatible
with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious
beliefs.”154 Third, the Court said “that in a democratic society the
State may limit the freedom to manifest a religion, for example by
wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes
with the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public
155
order and public safety,” and it may “impose on its serving or future
civil servants . . . the duty to refrain from taking part in the Islamic
fundamentalist movement, whose goal and plan of action is to bring
about the pre-eminence of religious rules.”156 Finally, the Court said
that “the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 11, and by Arts. 9 and 10 of
the Convention, cannot deprive the authorities of a State in which an
association, through its activities, jeopardizes that State’s institutions,
of the right to protect those institutions.”157

151. Id. at 13.
152. Id. at 18-19.
153. Id. at 33.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 34. The Court emphasized the context of Turkey where measures taken to
prevent undue pressure on students may be legitimate under Article 9(2). Id. This regulation
may include limiting the manifestation of the rites and symbols of the majority religion by
“imposing restrictions as to the place and manner of such manifestation with the aim of ensuring
peaceful co-existence between students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and
the beliefs of others.” Id.
157. Id. at 34-35.
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In its construction of Articles 10 and 11, the EC noted two other
aspects of the protection of individual rights that round out the
picture. First, freedom of expression in Article 10 “is applicable,
subject to para. 2, not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are
favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”158 As the
HRC notes in its General Comments to the ICCPR, an integral part
of religious freedom is the freedom to express religious views,
whether through publication and dissemination of religious materials,
or through religious teaching.159 Thus, the spirit of the religious
freedom protections in both the ICCPR and the ECHR includes the
freedom to espouse religious ideas and practice religious activity that
may be unpopular with majority religions or society at large, again
subject to the necessity limitations in both instruments. As the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty said in a recent Legal
Memorandum to the government of Sri Lanka, “Although [religious]
beliefs may be unsettling to some, the freedom to discuss and
disseminate such controversial beliefs—orally or in writing, privately
or in public, individually or in community—is firmly embedded in the
freedom to manifest religious belief.”160
Second, in Özdep v. Turkey, the EC found that Turkey had
violated Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of association) by
161
The
dissolving the Freedom and Democracy Party of Turkey.
Court called it “essential” that it found nothing in the Özdep’s
program “that can be considered a call for the use of violence, an
uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic principles.”162
Further, as the Court noted, “It is the essence of democracy to allow
diverse political projects to be proposed and debated, even those that
call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided that
they do not harm democracy itself.”163 Thus, when unpopular ideas
do not explicitly threaten a democratic government or the rights of
others, they are protected under Article 11 of the ECHR.
158. Id. at 33. See also Özdep v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 674, 701
(2001).
159. General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, ¶ 4.
160. Memorandum from Emilie L. Kao, Dir. of Int’l Advocacy, The Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, to President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Prime Minister
Mahinda Rajapakse, Sri Lanka 7 (July 22, 2004) (on file with the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty), avaible at http://www.lankaliberty.com/efforts/SLOpinionLetter.pdf.
161. 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705.
162. Id. at 702.
163. Id. at 703.
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B. Analysis of Secularism
There are significant problems with the principle of secularism as
a ground for restriction of religious liberty, and with the EC’s
enforcement of the principle. The first, and most obvious, is that
neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR list defending secularism in
principle as a ground upon which the manifestation of religious belief
may be restricted. As discussed above, the necessity clauses are to be
164
construed “strictly” as an exhaustive list of possible justifications.
Thus, defending the secular nature of the government from religious
influence, without a more specific showing that such influence is
actually a threat to the public welfare, is not a sufficient reason to
curtail religious freedom.
Second, the principle of secularism contradicts the “axiomatic”
principle that robust religious pluralism is fundamental to
165
democracy. To the extent that the principle of secularism functions
as an exclusionary mechanism for public expression of religious views,
it is in conflict with the robust pluralism embraced by both the ECHR
and the ICCPR. The pluralism embodied in these instruments is
normative rather than descriptive. That is, it is not merely an
observation that different religions exist, but rather a requirement
that governments allow religions to flourish in society so long as this
flourishing does not violate specifically defined limits. Such limits
may not, however, require a religious believer to change his or her
manifestation of religious belief and practice based simply on
suspicion of religiously informed opinions or specific religious groups,
or in keeping democratic government free from the influence of
religious ideas.
Central to the notion of pluralism is full participation in public
life without being required to leave religious motivations or beliefs in
private.166 Thus, the Turkish government’s position in Refah Partisi
that “religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics,
public affairs and legislative provisions”167 is incompatible with the
concept of pluralism as indissociable from democracy. The EC’s

164. See Kiss, supra note 22, at 308.
165. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of religious pluralism as fundamental to democracy.
166. Note that here the Article is not speaking of active efforts to install a theocratic form of
government in place of a democratic form of government. This would clearly require
restriction. Rather, the Article refers to religiously informed and even explicitly religious ideas
put forth in hopes of helping shape a more effective democratic society.
167. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 37 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1, 19 (2003).
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endorsement of such a view is in conflict with its explicit endorsement
of religious pluralism and its duty to require specific necessity to
curtail religious freedom. To the extent that Turkey and France, in
their application of the principle of secularism, are simply shielding
government and other citizens from the influence of committed
religious believers, they violate the principle of pluralism, and by
extension, the principles of democracy. Still more, to the extent that
Turkey excludes participation in public government on the basis of
certain religious practices or on the basis of membership in a religious
group, or put a different way, conditions participation in public
government on disavowal of such belief or membership, it violates the
principle of pluralism.
In its cases before the EC on this subject, Turkey seems to
equivocate the notions of “secularism” and “democracy.” In doing
so, the basic argument is this: protecting democracy in Turkey
requires protecting government from the influence of religion,
because in order to thrive as a democratic country we must keep our
government “neutral” (meaning secular). Thus arguing for the
principle of secularism is merely arguing for the principle of
democracy. The EC seems to endorse this equivocation as within the
margin of appreciation for Turkey by speaking of the democratic
168
“context” in Turkey. Turkey is right to think that human rights are
linked to the protection of democratic government in the ICCPR and
the ECHR.169 However, neither instrument endorses the view that
human rights, and particularly religious freedom, are linked to the
protection of secular government, when secular means protected from
the influence of religion.170 So long as protecting democracy (or
secularism) consists of restricting religious expression that seeks to
influence or criticize government (as in Turkey) or merely seeks to
168. See Başpinar v. Turkey, App. No. 45631/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD1, 5 (2003).
169. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep.
121, 148 (1998). The Court stated:
Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order.
That is apparent, first from the Preamble to the Convention, which establishes a very
clear connection between the Convention and democracy by stating that the
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms are
best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a
common understanding and observance of human rights.
Id.
170. See, e.g., Refah Partisi, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1. Note that when the Article says human
rights are not linked to protection of secular government, it is not meant to imply that they are
linked to religious government instead. The argument is not that government should be run by
religion, but that democratic government does not necessarily entail secular government to the
exclusion of active participation of religious adherents and religious views.
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express religious sensibility in public (France’s ban on religious
symbols in public schools), it is not justifiable under the ICCPR or the
ECHR.
Indeed, even the expression of a sentiment such as, “I would like
my religion to hold a dominant place in government” or “according to
the dictates of my religion, it should provide the rules by which our
government operates,” without more, would not overcome the
“pressing social need” requirement of both the ICCPR and the
ECHR. Theoretically, a large religious group’s expression of such
sentiments and intent to act on them could pose a threat to public
order. Without an express threat of “undemocratic” activity,
however, a mere possibility that such sentiment would threaten the
public order or the fundamental rights of another would usually be
too attenuated (and thus not pressing enough) under certain EC cases
to require the group to dissolve or discontinue dissemination of the
171
views. Thus, in Refah Partisi, the EC should have focused solely on
the problematic violent statements of the political party rather than
on a generalized need to protect the secular nature of the state from
unpopular and critical views.172 Similarly, in Kalaç and Başpinar, the
EC should not have entertained the idea that membership in a certain
religious group or the failure to uphold the principle of secularism as
such could be grounds (even if not the sole ground) for dismissal from
a government position. This is not to say that such dismissals could
not occur if the nature of the religious expression is truly threatening.
However, the EC’s decisions in deference to the principle of
secularism set dangerous precedent for restriction solely on the basis
of membership in a religious group.
Turkey and France might argue that the government has a
legitimate interest in protecting the secular character of government
from religious influence because to do otherwise would give the
appearance of an endorsement or establishment of religion.
However, the ICCPR and the ECHR religion clauses do not forbid
establishing a state religion so long as that establishment does not
discriminate against other religions or curtail the religious freedom of

171. See Özdep v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 674, 702 (2001)
(emphasizing the need for a call for violence or active rejection of democratic principles).
172. See Refah Partisi, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 17. One of those convicted of inciting the
people to hatred on the ground of religion had said the following in Parliament: “If you attempt
to close down the Iman-Hatip theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government,
blood will flow. It would be worse than in Algeria. I too would like blood to flow. That’s how
democracy will be installed. . . . I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.” Id.
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members of the non-state or majority religion.173 Even assuming a
state has a legitimate interest in avoiding an establishment of religion
(and this author believes it does), the EC “principle of secularism”
cases do not involve the danger of government-established religion.
Instead, they all involve the religious manifestations of individuals or
groups that express ideas in opposition to the government or
expressive of unpopular religious viewpoints. The motivation of the
Turkish government in each instance has been expressly to insulate
government from religious views.174 Turkey has put on no evidence
that the removal of individuals from positions in government was
necessitated by a need to avoid the appearance of an establishment of
religion. Similarly, there is no evidence that France’s ban on religious
symbols was motivated by this concern, and even if it was, the ban is
on individuals wearing religious symbols rather than the public school
displaying religious symbols. Thus, the religious expression the law
curtails would not be mistaken for government endorsement of any
particular religious viewpoint.
Finally, as noted above, the necessity clauses of both instruments
have in view a “pressing social need” to justify restrictions on
175
Thus, a per se principle of excluding religious
religious liberty.
manifestation in public institutions (such as a blanket ban on wearing
religious symbols) cannot possibly be justified under a strict construal
of the necessity doctrine.176 While a situation may arise in which
religious tensions in a public school, for instance, were so high that a
temporary ban would be justified to maintain order or to protect
others’ fundamental rights, the proscription would need to be more
narrowly tailored than a blanket ban. The government would have to
show the “pressing social need,” and the ban would have to be
proportionate to the need. Such a showing would be burdensome
without something more than the assumption that wearing religious
symbols might convey disrespect of the religious views of another.
The French Education Minister’s claim that the law calls for
“mutual respect” assumes that France can show that religious
symbols worn by public school students in France cause others to feel

173. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18; ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9.
174. See Refah Partisi, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 19.
175. The language of both documents reflects this in requiring a “necessity” to justify a
restriction on religious liberty. See supra note 9.
176. As noted above, the French law reads: “In public [primary and secondary schools], the
wearing of symbols or clothing through which the pupils ostensibly manifest a religious
appearance is prohibited.” France—Banning Religious Attire—United Sikhs, supra note 128.
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disrespected.177 It further ignores the fact that a wholly different
intent in religious symbolism is likely the motivation for most wearers
of religious symbols. Even if France could show that wearing such
symbols caused others to feel disrespected, to justify the blanket ban
France must then show that: (1) causing another to feel disrespected
by wearing a religious symbol is a violation of a fundamental right to
not feel disrespected (a difficult showing); (2) the alleged disrespect
caused by the religious symbols was stirring up the school so as to
create a threat to public order; or (3) wearing religious symbols
violated some well-ensconced moral order in France.178 Obviously,
such a showing would be nearly impossible. The EC’s acceptance of
the principle of secularism as a justification for restricting religious
liberty is not a faithful reading of the ICCPR and the ECHR, and
improperly makes room for illegitimate justifications for those
restrictions.
V. ÅKE GREEN: A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF
“NECESSITY” LEGISLATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
SECULARISM
The case of Åke Green in Sweden provides a test case for the
fitness of the principles analyzed above. Green is a pastor in Sweden
who was sentenced to one month imprisonment for preaching and
publishing a sermon containing “‘contemptuous expression’ toward
homosexuals.”179 In the sermon, Green called widespread practice of
homosexuality “‘a deep cancerous tumor in the entire society’ and

177. See supra Part IV.A for a description of this official’s defense of the law on these
grounds.
178. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18. “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” Id.
179. See Voong, supra note 114. Lest the Green case be viewed as anomalous, in July 2006,
two Australian pastors faced jail time for publicly comparing Christianity with Islam. See Aussie
Pastors Face Jail Sentences for Expressing Beliefs, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, Aug. 14, 2006, http://becketfund.org/index.php/article/520.html?PHPSESSID=d5e
9038d6ce5bb50b184af4da8feaddf. As of this writing, the case has not been resolved. Similarly,
in July 2006, four sisters from Mother Theresa’s Missionaries of Charity were arrested in India
for offering to pray for AIDS patients in hospitals. See Wu, supra note 81. On July 21, 2006,
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty testified before the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus that at least five Indian states have recently begun enforcing or strengthening anticonversion laws, and that Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have recently proposed anti-conversion
laws modeled after the Indian laws. See id.
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equated it with pedophilia.”180 Green lambasted the practice of
homosexuality and lamented that “[o]ur country is facing a disaster of
181
great proportions.” Green’s conviction came under a Swedish law
prohibiting the expression of disrespect towards favored minority
182
The conviction and sentence were overturned by the
groups.
Swedish Appeals Court (Göta Hövratt) in February 2005, which said
that “it is not the role of a government composed of men to declare
what is orthodoxy by punishing those who publicly teach one religious
view of what is right, even if that view may offend others.”183 It held
that Green “had a right to preach ‘the Bible’s categorical
condemnation of homosexual relations as a sin,’ even if that position
was ‘alien to most citizens’ and even if Green’s views could be
‘strongly questioned.’”184
The government petitioned Sweden’s
Supreme Court to reexamine the case, and the Swedish court
185
unanimously acquitted Green of all charges.
The Green case starkly raises the question of whether
government may restrict clearly unpopular religious expression. The
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued as Amicus Curiae that
Green’s religious expression “falls squarely within the protections of
186
Article 18” of the ICCPR. The brief argued that in preaching the
sermon, Green was “fulfilling his role as a leader of his congregants to
further their faith by teaching Christian doctrine and applying it to
their lives.”187 With regard to whether proscribing the conduct was
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others, the brief argued that
Green, “[f]ar from engaging in any conduct that put others at risk . . .

180. Keith B. Richburg, Swedish Hate-Speech Verdict Reversed: Sermon Condemning
Homosexuals Ruled Not Covered By Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, at A16.
181. Id.
182. Brottsbalken [BrB] [Criminal Code] 16:8 (Swed.), translated in http://www.legislation
line.org/upload/legislations/59/94/4c405aed10fb48cc256dd3732d76.pdf.
183. Voong, supra note 114.
184. Richburg, supra, note 180.
185. See Criminal Conviction for Preaching Overturned by Swedish High Court, THE
BECKETT FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Nov. 29, 2005, http://becketfund.org/index.php/
article/450.html; see also Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 p. 805
(Swed.), available at http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/2005/Dom%20pa%20engelska%20B%
201050-05.pdf.
186. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Åke
Green at 2-3, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 p. 805 (Swed.), available
at http://www.becketfund.org/pdfs/333_39.pdf.
187. Id.
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did nothing more than proclaim a religious viewpoint.”188 The fact
that his viewpoint was controversial and offended some people “does
189
not remove his religious teaching from Article 18’s protections.”
Finally, the brief noted that many religions “make claims of absolute
truth in prescribing certain views to be correct and certain conduct to
be either moral or immoral” and such propensity “may inevitably
cause offense.”190 However, “Article 18 provides that it is not the role
of a government composed of men to declare what is orthodoxy by
punishing those who publicly teach one religious view of what is right,
even if that view may offend others.”191
Is the Becket Fund’s position correct under the ICCPR and the
ECHR, or did this manifestation of religious belief cross into the
realm of restriction? Given the Swedish Supreme Court’s decision in
Green’s favor, the case will likely go no further. If the case had made
it to the HRC or the EC, however, the conviction most likely would
not have been upheld under the ICCPR or the ECHR. First, the case
did not involve the type of “influence” on government from a
position of civil authority or civil servant that the Turkey cases did.
Thus, the government of Sweden would not have been able to defend
the conviction on the ground that it was protecting democratic (or
“secular”) principles of government from undue religious influence.
Second, while the sermon used rather offensive language, it did not
advocate harm to homosexuals or threaten public disorder if the laws
on homosexuality in Sweden were not changed. Therefore, Sweden
could not have defended the conviction on the public order grounds.
Third, the sermon was not a threat to the public moral order
(assuming a majority acceptance of homosexuality). Disagreeing with
a moral order is not equivalent to threatening a moral order, and
more than a showing that the sermon challenged the public moral
order would be required to restrict the law on that ground. This
conclusion is supported by the EC position that even opinions that
may shock and offend deserve protection.192
Finally, Sweden’s best argument may have been the one France
has made to defend its secularism law, namely that the sermon

188. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 5.
191. Id. (emphasis in original).
192. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 37
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 33 (2003).
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“disrespects” homosexuals and causes offense to them.193 The facts
show that this has clearly been the result of the sermon; in other
words, Sweden is not just guessing that the view may offend many
people. However, subjective feelings of disrespect in general do not
amount to a justification for restriction of religious freedom under the
plain language of the ICCPR and ECHR. Had Green gone into a
personal harangue directed towards an individual homosexual using
the same language he used in the sermon, the case would pose a
different challenge. Such a personal and specific attack would quite
possibly violate the fundamental rights of another and thus be subject
to restriction. However, the distinction between a personal attack
and a sermon denouncing homosexuality generally is an important
one, because the former implicates others’ rights in a way that the
latter does not. In this case, the Becket Fund’s argument that Green
should not be restricted in teaching religious tenets of his faith to his
congregation would likely have prevailed in front of either judicial
body. This is only speculation. Some of the deferential language
used by the EC in the Turkey cases could have been applied in
principle here and might have caused the case to go the other way.
Even so, the ICCPR and the ECHR do not have in mind such
expression as a ground for government restriction of the freedom to
manifest religious belief.
CONCLUSION
The ICCPR and the ECHR are designed to give significant
protection to public manifestation of religious belief. The laws of
certain countries pose threats to this protection because of their
amorphous language and because they potentially allow restrictions
on the manifestation of religious belief when a “necessity” for such
restriction does not in fact exist. It is difficult to conclude exactly
which laws pose the greatest risk of being applied illegitimately to
curtail religious expression, but the EC and the HRC have generally
made the right decisions on this score and have developed principles
for curtailing the more egregious extensions of these laws restricting
religious liberty. The principle of secularism, however, is not
sufficient, without more, to restrict religious belief under the ICCPR
and the ECHR, and the EC has used language in its decisions that
gives inappropriate deference to government attempts to defend

193. See supra Part IV.A for a description of this official’s defense of the law on these
grounds.
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restrictions on secularism grounds. Åke Green’s conviction in
Sweden was overturned before it reached the international courts, but
other cases involving similar issues may soon give them a chance to
decide the extent to which governments may restrict the expression of
194
unpopular religious doctrine. Hopefully, either court would strike
down convictions similar to Green’s and would take care to provide a
careful analysis to give future guidance in assessing the appropriate
balance between religious liberty and legitimate government
restrictions on that liberty.

194. See supra note 179 for descriptions of Australian pastors and Indian nuns who have
been arrested for religious expression.

